The meanings of Nicaea: interpretation in fifth-century Christological controversies by Maier, Harry O.
Consensus
Volume 16
Issue 1 Hermeneutics: Theory and Practice Article 2
5-1-1990
The meanings of Nicaea: interpretation in fifth-
century Christological controversies
Harry O. Maier
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus
This Articles is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Consensus by an
authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.
Recommended Citation
Maier, Harry O. (1990) "The meanings of Nicaea: interpretation in fifth-century Christological controversies," Consensus: Vol. 16 : Iss.
1 , Article 2.
Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol16/iss1/2
The Meanings of Nicaea:
Interpretation in Fifth-Century
Christological Controversies
Harry O. Maier
Intern, Church of the Cross,
Victoria, British Columbia
One who would seek to understand interpretation in the
early church is faced with an immediate difficulty. How may
one understand early Christian interpretation without forcing
the evidence to fit one’s own interpretive categories, thereby
unduly distorting the evidence? That unwarranted distortion
has occurred may be seen in the way early Christian interpre-
tation is usually presented. It is a commonplace to find two
broad schools of interpretation identified in the patristic pe-
riod: one, associated with Alexandria, was characterized by a
speculative philosophical tradition and a wide-ranging use of
allegory; the other, associated with Antioch, enjoyed a more
conservative interpretive tradition, grounding typological exe-
gesis in the brute facts of history.^ Such constructs, in place at
least since the nineteenth century, pass largely unquestioned
from one generation of scholars to another. It is of course
true that two broad traditions of exegesis emerged in the early
church, as is testified by polemics against allegory on the Anti-
ochene side. But it is no accident that patristic interpretation
has been conceptualized primarily in terms of methodologies
(allegorical and typological) and schools (Alexandrian vs. An-
tiochene). For at least two hundred years theologians have been
preoccupied with method as the key to an objective historical
science of theology. And so if the great nineteenth century pa-
trologists assessed interpretation in the early church in terms of
method, they were only making the patristic church speak in a
language they could understand. The implicit circularity here
became vicious, however, when they forgot to distinguish their
own fascination with method and science from the interests of
early Christian interpreters.
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The example of Adolf von Harnack, perhaps the greatest
nineteenth-century interpreter of the early church, is illustra-
tive. Behind the development of Christian doctrine he discov-
ers the deployment of systematic methodologies designed to
erect what he describes as a “scientific Christian theology”. Al-
legory, in particular, suffers under Harnack’s critical eye. Philo
bequeathed “/ii5 fundamental hermeneutic principles'^ (Har-
nack’s emphasis) to Valentinus and Origen, who were in turn
able to reconcile the Gospel “with the religion and scientific
culture of the Greeks.” 2 Allegory (nothing less than “Biblical
alchemy” according to Harnack) was the hand-maiden of a his-
torical process whereby the freedom of the Gospel proclaimed
by Jesus and Paul mutated into the Law of dogma. Allegori-
cal method opened the way for theologians such as Origen to
achieve a systematic and legalistic conceptualization of Chris-
tianity in Greek philosophical and theoretical terms.
But his tracing of this development is by no means purely
descriptive. Harnack is entirely forthcoming in the profession
of his own aims.
The history of dogma, in that it sets forth the process of the origin
and development of the dogma, offers the very best means and
methods of freeing the Church from dogmatic Christianity, and of
hastening the inevitable process of emancipation, which began with
Augustine.^
There is a certain irony in all of this. For Harnack himself
was no opponent of systematic method (as indeed the reference
to method in the above quotation indicates). Indeed his com-
mitment to a rigorous historical-critical methodology is at the
heart of his attempts to emancipate from the encrustations of
dogma the real historical Jesus and to re-establish his historic
relationship with the world and God as the fundamental con-
tent of the Gospel. Thus when Harnack rails against the uses
of certain methods of interpretation in the early church he is
not doing so as one opposed to scientific methods, but rather as
one opposed to the wrong kinds. In fact, proper methodology
is the key to his whole undertaking of the recovery of the true
essence of Christianity. “What is Christianity?” asks Harnack
at the beginning of his book of the same title. “It is solely in its
historical sense that we shall try to answer this question here;
that is to say, we shall employ the methods of historical sci-
ence and the experience of life gained by witnessing the actual
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course of history.”"^ In setting things right, therefore, it is no
accident that it is primarily in terms of method that he seeks
to understand early Christian interpretation, nor is it merely
coincidental that it is on the level of method that his fiercest
criticisms of the early church are made. Method and method
alone is the key to truth.
^
But it is at least permissible to ask whether such a pre-
occupation with method does not distort the nature of early
Christian exegesis. I am not suggesting that early Christian
writers did not employ exegetical methods. I am quarrelling
with an interpretation of those methods which sees them as
consciously employed scientific philosophical tools. To inter-
pret them this way is simply to read one’s own interests into
the past and to force it to speak in one’s own terms.
Is there not a different way to read early Christian exege-
sis? I want to suggest one which arises out of a view which sees
early Christian hermeneutics, not as the deployment of scien-
tific methods in the service of theological systems, but rather
as a conversation with tradition.^
Consider the case of Origen, in Harnack’s estimation the
enfant terrible of scientific allegorism, “the father of ecclesi-
astical science”, the great “hellenizer” and transformer of a
historically grounded Gospel into a philosophical system.^ A
different, and I believe ultimately more faithful reading of the
evidence, begins not with method but tradition. Origen ’s most
systematic work. On First Principles^ begins not with a dis-
cussion of method but a charting of the tradition handed on
to him by the apostles (Preface, 4). Thus having established
the boundaries of the tradition, he fills in the content and only
towards the end of his work does he turn his attention to a
full exposition of the threefold method of interpretation (4.1 i).
What this suggests is not that Origen is concerned to construct
a systematic dogma, but that he is struggling to make sense
of the tradition passed on to him: he is engaged in a dialogue
or conversation with his tradition, a conversation in which he
genuinely seeks not only to listen to, but also appropriate his
tradition. Where he reflects upon the use of allegory or the de-
termination of the spiritual sense of Scripture, he connects the
attempts to find the deeper meaning of the divinely inspired
text not with the canons of a systematically derived method of
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interpretation, but with a mysterious God who has so charged
the world and scripture with meaning that they can be read
on various levels. Origen inherited from the Alexandrian pla-
tonism of Philo and Clement a view of physical creation which
saw the visible world as the embodiment or effulgence of a tran-
scendent rationality, a notion which spills over into his under-
standing of the sacred text.® Allegory, therefore, is not so much
a scientific methodological key to unlocking the meaning of a
text as it is indicative of a fundamental stance of being in the
world. An allegorical hermeneutics arises out of and reinforces
a mode of existence in a world filled with divine meanings.
In early Christian exegesis what I have described as a con-
versation with tradition extended beyond the interpretation of
the Bible. In the fourth century the rule of faith which Origen
presents as the starting point of his dialogue is replaced by the
conciliar statements of the councils of Nicaea (325 C.E.) and
Constantinople (381 C.E.). In particular, the Nicene creed be-
comes a central text which orients theological discussion. As we
will see, there are theological reasons for this. In the following
discussion I will show how tradition, specifically that repre-
sented by the Council of Nicaea,^ functioned in constituting
understanding in one particular case; the fifth-century dispute
between Nestorius (d. ca. 451 C.E.) and Cyril of Alexandria
(d. 444 C.E.) over the title Theotokos. In their correspondence
with each other each lays hold of the heritage of Nicaea, but
seeks to appropriate it in different ways. The debate over the
proper meaning of the Nicene text has a central place in their
writings. To use a spatial analogy, Nicaea presents a broad
vista which is seen from particular vantage points and inter-
preted accordingly. I am interested in the various points of
fusion between the horizon extended by Nicaea and the gaze
of Cyril and Nestorius.
The debate between Cyril and Nestorius concerning the
propriety of naming Mary, Theotokos, i.e. Mother of God,
is a complex one. Very generally stated, what is behind the
disagreement is a theological difficulty which emerged in the
wake of Nicene orthodoxy: if the Son is homoouios with the
Father, i.e. essentially and not derivatively divine, and if Jesus
was a human being, a problem arises as to how one is properly
to conceptualize the union of natures in the person of Christ.
Cyril proposed a union between the natures so intimate that
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one could legitimately profess Mary to be the Mother of God.
His central christological proof text, Phil. 2:6-11, is repeat-
edly cited to support his contention that the proper subject of
Christ’s human experiences was the Logos, the divine person
who was made flesh. But Cyril is also committed to main-
taining a distinction of the natures; they are both present in
the person of Jesus but in an unconfused way. How this unity
may be explained Cyril cannot say: the union of natures is
ineffable or mysterious. Cyril does, however, try to clarify the
limits of acceptable teaching concerning this mystery by us-
ing theological language akin to the trinitarian vocabulary of
his contemporaries. His overriding concern is to preserve a
natural unity of the two natures (technically named by him a
“hypostatic union”) in the one person Jesus.
Cyril’s preference for the title Theotokos raised the suspi-
cion in the mind of his contemporary, Nestorius, Patriarch of
Constantinople, that the Alexandrian was confusing the divine
and human natures in Jesus. Instead of the title “Mother of
God”, Nestorius preferred “Mother of humanity”, anthropo-
tokos, or “Mother of Christ”, Christotokos. In this way he
hoped to preserve a distinction between the human and divine
natures. Rather than referring to the Word becoming flesh,
Nestorius speaks instead of the Word assuming flesh or a full
human being. Where Cyril speaks of a natural union between
divinity and humanity in one person, Nestorius refers instead
to the analogy of a moral union, a union of the divine and
human wills in Christ. Where Cyril ventures to make the di-
vine Logos the subject of the incarnate experiences of Jesus,
Nestorius prefers rather to speak of “Christ”, the historical
person constructed of two natures. Thus instead of a natural
union, Nestorius would have a “prosopic union”, a union or
conjunction of persons, or the properties of persons, in the one
historical person, Jesus of Nazareth. He hopes in this way to
avoid what he regards as a confusion of natures by Cyril. In
the end he was charged, and ultimately condemned and ex-
iled, for teaching that there were two Sons in Jesus—a kind
of schizophrenic Christ with two personalities. But it is ironic
that the heresy of Nestorianism associated with him is proba-
bly not indicative of his own teaching. Nestorius’ reference to
the distinction of natures in Christ is tempered with a concern
to assert what he calls a “deep unity”. Or when he refers to the
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separate persons of the natures he qualifies himself by stating
that the two persons are not distant from each other and that
one may properly refer only to one person, Jesus Christ. 12
This all too brief resume of the ideas of these two theolo-
gians is consistent in form with the majority of contemporary
presentations of their thought. But it is misleading to sum-
marize these two christologies in this way. One is left with
a false impression of a series of abstract metaphysical defini-
tions created ex nihilo and then piled upon one another. But
such complex conceptualizations did not emerge like Athene
from the head of Zeus, perfectly formed without a pre-history
of understanding. In fact, Cyril’s and Nestorius’ christologi-
cal speculation occurs within the context of a very intriguing
debate over the proper definition of an inherited theological
tradition. Thus Cyril’s so-called Epistula Dogmatica, his sec-
ond letter to Nestorius written near the outset of the dispute
in 429 C.E., sets the tone for christological reflection and de-
bate by claiming the authority of “the teachings of the holy
Fathers” and citing the words of “the great and holy council”
(Nicaea).l^ Nestorius responds in kind by asserting that he is
preserving intact the “inspired chorus of the Fathers”. 1^ Either
writer is certain that it is he, not his opponent, who is properly
expounding the content and meaning of the tradition handed
on to him.
The abundant references to the “Fathers” in the writings of
these theologians is significant. The term had already begun
to appear in the synodal statements and theological writings
of the fourth century, but gained a more widespread usage in
the theological literature of the succeeding century. Ecclesias-
tical historians roughly contemporary with Cyril and Nesto-
rius, such as Theodoret, Sozomen, and Socrates, refer to those
gathered at Nicaea with phrases such as the “holy Fathers of
Nicaea”.^^ From a modern perspective it is perhaps surprising
that ascriptions such as these seem to have little to do with the
passage of time: they are not “Fathers” because they lived long
ago (less than two years after the Council of Ephesus Cyril re-
peatedly refers to those gathered at the council as “Fathers”),
rather they are accorded this title because of the episcopal seats
they occupy. The title points back to an understanding of tra-
dition developed in the second century against gnostic claims
to a secret tradition. Anti-gnostic writers such as Irenaeus
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and Tertullian asserted that the true apostolic teaching is to
be found in the instruction of those bishops who can identify
a public chain of succession reaching from themselves back to
the apostles. Apostolic teaching here is understood as a body
of knowledge, written, oral, or even in the form of practices,
passed on unchanged from generation to generation. Those
who receive it and transmit it faithfully are “Fathers”: they
represent the living voice of the apostles, who in turn repre-
sented Jesus, who ultimately derived his teaching from God
the Father. Thus, when the bishops meet and agree on a given
topic, it is the teaching of the apostles they are presenting.
Fifth-century ecclesiastical historians can refer to the Ni-
cene Creed in terms of divine inspiration. The logic is similar
to that already presented: if the teaching of the apostles was
divinely inspired and that teaching is represented by the teach-
ing of bishops which perfectly restates what has been received,
then what the bishops teach when gathered together in an ec-
umenical (i.e. universal) council is necessarily also a divinely
inspired restatement of apostolic teaching.
Given this high view of the authority of tradition an in-
teresting state of affairs occurs when there is disagreement
over the proper way to interpret what has been passed oa.
In the case of Cyril and Nestorius, both claim to be faith-
ful transmitters of the authoritive tradition and accuse each
other of innovation. This occurs in various forms. First, for
the first time in theological discussion, each writer formulates
catenae or catalogues of the “sayings of the Fathers” to prove
that his christology represents orthodox teaching. The writ-
ers cited (often the same ones, and indeed the same passages!)
are the major anti-Arian (i.e. pro-Nicene) theologians of the
fourth century: Athanasius, the Cappadocians, Ambrose, and
others. The battle to claim the authority of these teachers
becomes uglier when Cyril seeks to undercut the legitimacy
of the christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia, the heroic anti-
Arian theologian of the East, and, more importantly, Nestorius’
teacher. For Nestorius, Cyril’s attack on this great Father in-
dicates what kind of heretic the Alexandrian really is.^^ Again,
to attack the authority of the Fathers is to call into question
the very foundation of the apostolic teaching.
Further, the assertion that Nestorius’ or Cyril’s own teach-
ing reflects that of deceased orthodox teachers is set in stronger
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relief by identifying the christology of one’s opponent with that
of arch heretics of the past. If there is a list of “worthies” with
whom Cyril or Nestorius seeks to identify himself, he seeks
equally to identify his opponent with those false teachers who
have sought to corrupt and distort the apostolic legacy. This
is another way of placing oneself within a particular tradition
of understanding and claiming it as one’s own. Nestorius is an
Arian, contends Cyril, because he denies that Mary can be said
to be the Mother of God (a tacit dismissal of Christ’s essen-
tial divinity). No, Cyril is the Arian, says Nestorius, because
in claiming that God was born of Mary he is stating that the
Logos is changeable (i.e. able to be born) and is therefore a
creation. Nestorius is a Manichaean, argues Cyril, because he
denies that the Logos really took flesh and was born of Mary;
no, replies Nestorius, it is the Alexandrian bishop who is a
disciple of Mani precisely because an unchangeable God can-
not be born; thus if Cyril wants to maintain that the Logos
is the subject of the human experiences of Christ and avoid
the error of Arianism, he must assert that Jesus was not re-
ally human. Cyril is Apollinarian; Nestorius is an adoptionist:
the examples could be multiplied. In all of this there is tra-
dition at work, negative and positive genealogies designed to
demonstrate that one does or does not have a right to claim
the authority of tradition for the christological interpretation
advanced.
The formulation of catenae of sayings and the identifica-
tion with a form of heretical teaching serve to support a much
more important claim: that each position faithfully reproduces
the meaning of the Nicene Creed. Since by the outset of the
fifth century the Nicene Creed emerges as the definition of or-
thodox teaching, christological debate focuses on the proper
interpretation of the text of the creed. The fact that the de-
bate over the proper interpretation of the creed occurs along-
side references to heretics and revered past teachers indicates
that neither Cyril nor Nestorius comes to the creed de novo.
Rather their interpretations arise out of a pre-history extend-
ing from Nicaea to their contemporary dispute. The creed is
presented in the context of a horizon which appears as a result
of a pre-history of theological conflicts (first with Arian, and
later with Apollinarian, teaching). Thus Cyril, for example,
not only interprets the creed with a view to refuting the opin-
ions of Nestorius, his interpretations appear within a horizon
Meanings of Nicaea 17
of tradition which provides him with a particular orientation
toward the Nicene text. Because, for example, the Apollinar-
ian appropriation of that tradition (that Christ was two-thirds
human and one-third divine) is judged heretical by Cyril and
his orthodox contemporaries, when Cyril exegetes the text of
the creed in order to support his high christology, he must also
demonstrate that he confesses that Christ was fully human.
Contemporary christological controversies (Apollinarian, Ar-
ian, etc.) present Cyril, as indeed Nestorius, with a particular
vantage point from which he gains the meaning of the creed.
But the horizon which extends forward from Nicaea to Cyril
and Nestorius does not wholly predetermine the point of view
which these authors bring to it. Stated in other words, these
writers not only receive the sense of the creed, they give sense
to the creed. Indeed, that they bring a point of view indicates
that the meaning of the Nicene creed is not fixed or static.
Rather, either author brings with him a set of questions which
means that the horizon will be seen in this or that way. There
are various points of fusion between the horizon of interpreter
and text, various ways in which the meanings contained within
the words of the creed may be appropriated.
This is illustrated in Cyril’s and Nestorius’ dispute in two
ways. First, a fascinating debate rages between them over
which is the proper starting point from which to uncover the
christology Nicaea presents. In Ep. 55, otherwise known as
his Letter on the Greedy Cyril cites the opening words of the
second article of the Nicene Creed (“I believe in one Lord Je-
sus Christ”) in support of a union of natures. To support his
contention that the Logos is the true subject of Christ’s incar-
nation he cites the order of the phrases which directly follow:
first there is reference to the divine nature, ending with the
words “Through him all things were made.” Then follows the
description of the incarnation. According to Cyril, it is clear
who is the proper subject of the professions concerning the his-
torical events of Jesus’ life, it has already been stated in the
words which describe the divine nature of the Son: the Logos
who is consubstantial with the Father. Thus when Cyril reads
the phrase “he became incarnate from the Virgin Mary, and
was made human,” the subject of the clause refers back to the
Logos; consequently, “was made human” is describing the self-
emptying of God in a human being. Thus, Cyril concludes.
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“Accordingly, following the footsteps of the confession of the
Fathers without deviation we say that the very Word of God
the Father, begotten as the only begotten Son, was incarnate,
and was made man, suffered, died and rose from the dead on
the third day” (55.33). And he gains this understanding from
his reading of the text of the creed.
Nestorius accuses Cyril of making a false beginning in his
reading of the creed which results in the latter confusing the
divine and human natures in Christ’s person. He contends
that the words “one Lord Jesus Christ” refer to the one person
[prosopon) in whom the natures are united. When the creed
goes on to refer to “the only Son of God” “eternally begotten
of the Father... of one being with the Father” and, later, to the
one “incarnate from the Virgin Mary... crucified under Pontius
Pilate” and so on, the formulators at Nicaea were defining the
two natures from which the one person Jesus Christ was con-
structed. It is not the Logos who is the subject of the second
article, but he who enjoys both natures, Jesus Christ. Cyril
is corrupting the clear sense of the Nicene text when he posits
his interpretation.
Observe then first who reduces and takes away from the deposit
which has been laid down by the fathers (i.e. Nicaea), but lets not
(anyone else) steal aught therefrom. This man (i.e. Cyril) who has
made no mention of the beginning and avoided the beginning and
made a beginning which they laid not down but in this wise passed
over the beginning and wished not to make a beginning therefrom,
whereas it is I who have established the things which the fathers
rightly said, and I said that we would make a beginning from here
showing also the cause wherefore they first laid down the names
which are common to the divinity and the humanity and then built
up thereon the tradition of the Incarnation and of the Sufferings and
of the Resurrection, “first laying down the names of the two natures
which indicate that these are common, without the Sonship or the
Lordship being separated and without the natures, in the union of
the Sonship, coming into danger of corruption and of confusion.”^®
And so Nestorius claims that it is he, not Cyril, who is
reading the text as it was intended to be understood.
But Cyril and Nestorius are not content merely to quote the
creed at each other to arrive at the sense of the text. A second
way in which the meaning of the text is arrived at is through
the deployment of specially formulated christological language.
Terms such as “hypostasis”, “prosopon”, “physis”, “henosis”.
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and so on appear repeatedly as either author attempts to at-
tain the meaning of the text before him. This raises for both
authors a particularly complex problem because none of these
terms in fact appears in the text in question. In many instances
the logic of polemic leads them to argue that their terminology
faithfully represents the intentions of the authors of the Nicene
creed. Both authors often appear to proceed on the assump-
tion that the formulators of the creed arranged the order of
the clauses of the Nicene text to stave off the interpretation
of their opponent, even that they did so “not fortuitously but
by the divine purpose.” The order of the words and clauses
of the text is thus seen as a means to the original thoughts
of the authors.20 When they argue in this way there is no ac-
knowledgement of a distance between their dispute and the
formulators of Nicaea. On this basis each can claim that he is
representing the original thoughts or intentions of the Nicene
authorities, without addition or diminution. 21
But there are a few intriguing passages which acknowledge
a degree of distance between the Nicene authorities and Cyril
and Nestorius. Both writers realize that they are doing more
than just reciting the words of the creed, they are attempting
to express the meaning of those words. Terms such as theotokos
and anthropotokos serve as points of fusion between the words
of the text and the sense which either author brings to it. 22
Both authors must admit that these terms do not appear in the
creed, but they are equally firm in their conviction that they
express its meaning. Thus Nestorius admits that although he
is not saying anything different from what is expressed by the
creed or authoritative teachers before him, he is giving a fuller
exposition of previous statements.23 Similarly, Cyril is able to
make a distinction between the words of the creed and their
interpretation. Indeed he accounts for the ideas of Nestorius
on the basis of this distinction. Thus he promises in many of
his epistles to give a full exposition of and commentary on the
meaning of the words of the text. 24 It is on these bases that ei-
ther author is able to justify the deployment of a sophisticated
series of christological concepts and vocabularies which appear
neither in the creed nor in the authorities they cite.
It is necessary to make a distinction here between Cyril
and Nestorius’ own estimation of their commentaries and ex-
positions of the creed and a contemporary appraisal of them.
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Given the strong emphasis of the authority of tradition and
the charges against innovation levelled against each other, it is
not surprising that either author claims that his exposition is
drawing out more precisely the intended meaning of the text.
But there is another way of understanding their reflections on
the creed which acknowledges their own contribution to the
discovery of the meaning of the text. They are not only un-
covering a meaning, they are giving a meaning to the creed.
The space between interpreter and text is productive of mean-
ing especially when the overcoming of that space becomes the
occasion of a deployment of new terminology designed to ap-
propriate the text with a view to contemporary concerns. The
language of the interpreter creates meaning as much as it un-
covers it, inasmuch as the text is made to answer in terms of
the logic of the questions set before it. The anachronistic as-
sertion of Cyril or Nestorius that the creed was providentially
formulated to prevent the christological misunderstanding of
his opponent in fact points to the meanings they created in
their debate with each other.
Although either author can claim to be reconstructing the
original thoughts or intentions behind the text and to be
spelling them out more fully through the form of commentary
on the text, there is another way of understanding what they
were doing when debating with each other. Rather than fo-
cussing on intentionality, one can instead refer to the polarity
which exists between text and interpreter. Here interpretation
is not the rethinking of original thoughts behind the words of
a text, but the overcoming of the distance between text and
interpreter. The difference is an important one. In the for-
mer case, there is only one meaning of a text (in this case
the Nicene creed), that which is in harmony with the authors’
intended meaning; the interpreter is locked into the task of re-
constructing the past as a means of access to the mind of the
authors. In the latter case, because it is primarily the text
and not authorial intent one is trying to understand, a space
is opened for a variety of meanings as different readers with
different interests try to come to terms with a wide possibility
of meanings the text presents. Thus, as questions concerning
the text and issues surrounding it differ, new meanings are cre-
ated in the movement back and forth between interpreter and
text. The form of the questions asked is delimited by the tra-
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dition in which they are formulated. Because Cyril and Nesto-
rius come to the text with similarly formulated questions and
because their questions arise out of a particular tradition of
christological reflection, they cross the space separating inter-
preter and text in the same way and thus can engage in debate
with each other. Yet it is precisely because this space is never
overcome that Cyril and Nestorius can read the same text in
different ways, bring different vocabularies to the text, and de-
rive different meanings from it. Thus the text opens a series
of different horizons, or a series of meanings which allow for a
variety of points of fusion with the interpreter. One’s horizon
of interpretation is not a closed, uni-directional, pre-textual
psychological history of intention, but rather an open dialec-
tical one in which present interests discover textual meaning
and textual meaning reforms interpretive textual meaning and
textual meaning reforms interpretive interests.
This assessment of the interpretation of the creed by Cyril
and Nestorius opens for the pastor a new way of appropriat-
ing early Christian interpretation. On the one hand one is
not confined to pitting outmoded methodologies against each
other (allegorical and typological vs. historical critical). This
way of assessing early Christian interpretation will be seen as
largely irrelevant. On the other hand, one is not straitjack-
eted in an endless repristinating traditionalism which merely
seeks to remouth what past luminaries have stated. Rather
one is invited to engage in the continued process of movement
across the space separating text and interpreter and to continue
the production of meaning which interpretation necessarily in-
volves. In the case of the Nicene creed, this implies that the
text is not a dead artifact of bygone christological disputes, but
that it may be reappropriated as the horizon between pastor
and text becomes fused at different points. In the remainder
of this discussion I should like to show how one contemporary
theologian has continued the conversation with tradition which
I am proposing here.
Liberation Theology and dogmatic reflection on the nature
of the Trinity are not what one usually associates. But in his
book entitled Trinity and Society Leonardo Boff, a Franciscan
Brazilian priest, seeks to appropriate the traditional doctrine
of the Trinity from the liberationist point of view.^^ In the
process of that appropriation Boff reflects upon the conciliar
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definitions concerning the nature of Christ and patristic for-
mulations concerning the Trinity.
Much of Trinity and Society is taken up with recounting
and describing ways in which the Trinity has been understood
and conceptualized in the past. In this way Boff seeks to place
himself squarely in the patristic trinitarian tradition of reflec-
tion, especially as it developed after the categories of Nicene
theology became established orthodoxy. Twenty centuries of
trinitarian theology form the horizon which shapes his under-
standing of God. But Boff is not happy merely to record the
statements of bygone theologians and councils; he is commit-
ted to the tradition, not to traditionalism. He seeks to enter
into a dialogue with the tradition from the perspective of what
he calls “a changed cultural situation.”27 Throughout his book
he determines what implications the traditional doctrine of the
Trinity has for the shaping and governance of human society.
This is a pressing issue for him because of the forms of so-
cial oppression, inequity, and injustice he sees in his own Latin
American society.
Boff thus seeks to find a point of fusion between issues which
are of importance for him from a liberationist perspective and
the broad horizon of trinitarian reflection. Briefly stated, he
discovers such a point of fusion in the trinitarian understanding
of perichoresis^ the mutual indwelling and interpenetration of
the three divine persons of the Trinity. For Boff, the self-giving
and self-identification of each member of the Trinity with each
other member (without, however, loss of identity of each per-
son) is a model for shaping human community. Instead of
a patriarchal monotheism, in which God the Father occupies
the top of a hierarchical pyramid of authority, with Son and
Holy Spirit below, Boff prefers to understand the Trinity in
a way more consistent with patristic writers from the fourth
century onward. This understanding of God is used by him
to legitimate a vision of society, based on a shared community
of goods, in which individuals live with and for one another.
The all-important focus of unity for him in his understanding
of the oneness of the triune God is the communion between
the divine persons.28 Boff stands firmly in the western Augus-
tinian tradition of trinitarian reflection when, in addition to
the substantive category of essence, he portrays the unity of
the three persons in terms of relations.2^
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Father, Son and Holy Spirit live in community because of the com-
munion between them. Communion is the expression of love and
life. Life and love, by their very nature, are dynamic and overflow-
ing. So under the name of God we should always see Tri-unity,
Trinity as union of Father, Son and Holy Spirit.
Father implies the presence of Son, the love of Father and
Son is expressed in their shared out-breathing of the Holy
Spirit. The language of dogma is given life by Boff when, in a
way reminiscent of nineteenth-century socialist divines such as
F.D. Maurice, he derives from his understanding of the mutual
relatedness of the members of the Trinity a model for a just
and equitable society.^1 Ideally, according to Boff, because hu-
mans are created in the image and likeness of God, society too
is to express that image.
The hypostatic union of the divine and human natures in
one person, Jesus, reasserts christologically the communion be-
tween persons Boff finds in the Trinity. The doctrine of com-
municatio idiomatum which asserts that the union between the
divine and human natures in Jesus is so intimate that one can
properly speak of an interchange of properties proper to the
divine and human natures respectively, similarly expresses a
model for human community where members of society iden-
tify with one another as fully as possible, while maintaining
their distinctive individuality.^^
Boff’s reflections on the doctrine of the Trinity from a cul-
tural perspective of liberation represents one instance of con-
temporary conversation with tradition. I suggest that his form
of reflection is not different in kind from that undertaken by
Cyril and Nestorius (though of course he would articulate what
he is doing differently from these fifth-century theologians). In
either case there is a fusion of horizons which arises out of a
movement to and fro between the interests contemporary with
the writer and the received tradition. The space between self
and tradition or self and text of tradition becomes productive
of meaning as one struggles to appropriate and make familiar
what stands over against and alien to oneself. The pastor as she
or he is invited to reflect upon and engage the tradition enters
similarly into conversation. Through the process of interpreta-
tion the contemporary pastor similarly discovers meanings for
his or her distinctive cultural setting, points of fusion between
present theological challenges and the tradition which stands
over against him or herself, and so makes tradition one’s own.
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